f-log

Anagram Shark Attack my latest silverlight project is completed.
The first project IDOUDO was a blatant hack, quick, simple but hardly painless.
mousetrails was just a Proof of concept.
Where as twitternice was a much more serious attempt the code is painful. all in one file and hardly any classes.
Anagram Shark Attack on the other hand has had a lot of love poured into it from the preloader, post loader, graphics and not to mention the rewrite.
When I first thought Anagram Shark Attack was complete, my testing showed that the tile dragging and orienting worked correctly and the sharks attacking work correctly, unfortunately the two were mutually exclusive. The game state was rooted in the places the tiles 'could' by located, but this fell down when the time for a tile to change from one state to another was interrupted by another process. It was comical, the game would start fine then as more attacks took place tiles would vanish or appear seemingly at random.
The rewrite allowed me to clean this up and set the tiles state to the tile objects themselves allowing anything to happen at anytime regardless of what had or was happening at the time.
There are a few screen shots on the page so my Linux friends get an idea whats going on.

Their first steps are great and starting to talk is nice but when dealing with toddlers the one ability you always wished they would learn is for them to be able to change their own nappy.

So I was happy when on Sunday morning I found Alex with a new nappy on and neatly placed soiled one the wrong side of his stair gate.

This event was taken down a peg when on closer inspection the newly applied nappy was on backwards, but it was still an impressive feat.

For starters the soiled nappy wearer has to note the soiled status and decide a course of action, which in this case was to locate the clean nappy draw, retrieve a nappy, remove the spent nappy, dispose of it and to apply a new nappy. None of these instructions appear in a toddlers usual lexicon.

Unfortunately there is a blackened lining to every silvery cloud and whilst sleeping soundly on the sofa later that morning I noted the verbal communication "wee wee potty". Had I know what was about to happen I would not have lain peacefully any longer, having leapt to my feet and vacated the sofa very promptly.

For mere seconds after that utterance a full potty was emptied over my head, that will teach me to sleep when utterly exhausted from the previous day, days, weeks, months etc.

There is blood in the water, Beware !!

This is mans single most achievement, behold
http://www.freemaptools.com/tunnel-to-other-side-of-the-earth.htm
I think this solidly proves we were lied too as kids !!

spam assassin normally does a good job and I bet a couple of dodgy emails a day unfiltered but blacklisted so it was a shock to find 666 blacklisted but not spam listed emails today all to *RANDOMNUMBER*@somescrapable email address.
Started getting ISP email noting my mail box was full, thats with KMail downloading ALL mail from the server once an hour. So in those 60 mins I had got enough back scatter spam to trigger the warning system at the ISP.

So I created my cryptonomicon thingambob and it is good!
#!/bin/bash
# gets a word and allows the user to confirm there acceptance that it should be marked.
# added two type of marks and a context viewer
# rob 2008
# cat $BOOK | sed -e 's/\([^a-zA-z0-9]\)/\n/gi' | grep -v '[0-9]' | sort -fu > $FILENAME

FILENAME=cryptowords.sorted
BOOK=stephenson-neal-cryptonomicon.txt

# yes, I do notice that the paramater is never actually used, thankyou
function offerWord() {
    echo "do you understand $WORD ?"
    echo -n "[y]es / [n]o / [i] looked it up / [c]ontext::"
    read ANS
    if [ $ANS = "y" ]; then
        echo good, try again
        cat $FILENAME | sed -e "s/\(^$WORD$\)/#\1/" > $FILENAME.x ; mv $FILENAME.x $FILENAME
    elif [ $ANS = "i" ]; then
        echo good for you
        cat $FILENAME | sed -e "s/\(^$WORD$\)/@\1/" > $FILENAME.x ; mv $FILENAME.x $FILENAME
    elif [ $ANS = "c" ]; then
        cat $BOOK | grep $WORD | sed -e "s/\b\($WORD\)\b/---[[\1]]---/"
        offerWord $WORD
        exit
    fi
}

WORD=`cat $FILENAME | sort -R | grep -v '#' | grep -v '@' | head -n 1`
offerWord $WORD
stats so far are 210 words known, 13 words I had to look up, 22201 to go :)
Oh, and I am only half way through the book ...

I have been reading Neal Stephenson's Cryptonomicon (review when I finish it) and found some of the wording used completely alien.
Soooo... I download a plain text version of the book and it has 496945 words in it.
Removing duplicates, words with numbers and ignoring case got me to 22424 words.
A fair number are German so I might try and filter those.
Although I can not find any examples right now, a quick random selection gives you some idea how varied the book is
daring
sumo
stodgy
chamois
misty
demonstrates
vertex
stretcher
orbits
mountainous
Ah! found one, animadverted
now to make some kind of thingambob that I can pull random words and mark them once I know what they mean ...

While standing in the bank queue on Monday (32mins) I realised that not only could I and everyone see each customers PIN number as it was entered at the cashiers desk but that there was a fundamental cryptographic flaw in the PIN number system.

To prove this flaw I concocted a complex algorithm that could compute ALL the possible PIN numbers is a given key space.

So after many hours of processing (if the algorithm had been run on a very VERY slow computer) I had an entire credit card PIN number rainbow table !!

Use wisely, jumpstation.co.uk makes no warranty to the contents of this file and is made available for research purposes only.

pin.numbers

FAQ::
what is the most common PIN number?
1234

what is the most uncommon PIN number?
0003

how can I link a credit card number to a PIN number?
trial and error

how can I crack a credit card using the rainbow table?
simply try each entry in the table until a match is found

I tried the above method and card keeps being "retained by bank"
only try one PIN number per week, you should exhaust the key space in just over 19 years.

Wait a minute, how did you work out the most common and least common PIN numbers ?
that information is currently not being made available to the public